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Reforming the European Insolvency Regulation – a Legal and Policy Perspective  
 
This paper will critically evaluate the proposals for reform of the European Insolvency 
Regulation - regulation 1346/2000 - advanced by the European Commission.1 While criticised by 
some commentators as unsatisfactory, the Regulation is widely understood to work in practice.2  
The Commission proposals have been described as ‘modest’3 and it is fair to say that they amount 
to a ‘service’ rather than a complete overhaul of the Regulation.4  The proposals will be 
considered under the following heads (1) General Philosophy; (2) Extension of the Regulation to 
cover pre-insolvency procedures; (3) Jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings; (4) Co-
ordination of main and secondary proceedings; (5) Groups of Companies; (6) Applicable law; (7) 
Publicity and improving the position of creditors. 
A final section concludes.  The general message is that while there is much that is laudable in the 
Commission proposals, there is also much that has been missed out, particularly in the context of 
applicable law.  The proposals reflect an approach that, in this particular area, progress is best 
                                          
1 See  Report from the Commission on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 
of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings COM (2012)743 and Proposal for a new Regulation 
COM (2012) 744 final. See also the Hess/Oberhammer/Pfeiffer external evaluation of the 
Regulation. - JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4.  On the same day as its proposals for reform of the 
Insolvency Regulation the Commission also released a Communication  A new European 
approach to business failure and insolvency  COM (2012) 742 and a Commission  Staff Working 
Document -  SWD (2012) 416 final. See now the Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the proposal for a new Regulation – 2013/C 271/10 and the report from the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposed new Regulation dated 11th 
September 2013 (the “Lehne 2 report”). 
2  See the statement in the Commission report that the “Regulation is generally regarded as  
successful instrument for the coordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings in the Union”  
- COM (2012) 743 final at p  4. 
3 See H Eidenmuller, “A New Framework for Business Restructuring in Europe: The EU 
Commission’s Proposals for a Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation and Beyond” 
(2013) 20 Maastricht Journal 133, 150. 
4 See M Arnold QC, “The Insolvency Regulation: a Service or an Overhaul” South Square Digest 
(May 2013, 28). 
achieved by a series of small steps rather than by a great leap forward.  This is not necessarily an 
approach that is mirrored in other areas of European policy making.5 
 
A. General philosophy 
The professed objective of the Insolvency Regulation is achieve greater efficiencies and 
effectiveness in the administration of cross-border insolvency cases.6 The preamble to the 
regulation also mentions the prevention of forum shopping i.e. the movement of assets or judicial 
proceedings from one Member State to another so as to try to take advantage of a more 
favourable legal position.7  
The Regulation puts in place a detailed framework for the management of cross-border 
insolvency cases within Europe and attempts a partial harmonization of conflicts-of-law rules but 
it does not say much about substantive insolvency law.  The State where the debtor has its centre 
of main interests or ‘COMI’ is given centre stage when it comes to collection and administration 
of the debtor’s assets. The COMI State is given the exclusive authority to open main insolvency 
proceedings in respect of the debtor8  and the decision to open such proceedings must be given 
                                          
5 For instance, in the private law field the proposal for a Common European Sales Law – see 
SEC( 2011) 1165 final and SEC (2011) 1166  final and for a critical evaluation see S Whittaker, 
“Identifying the Legal Costs of Operation of the Common European Sales Law'”(2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 85. 
6 Recitals 2 and 3. See generally on the Regulation, G Moss, I Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed 2009); I Fletcher, Insolvency in 
Private International Law  (Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed 2005). The background of many of the 
underlying principles and detailed rules in the Regulation are explained in the Virgos-Schmit 
Report on the draft EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, which preceded and 
foreshadowed the Regulation. While the Virgos-Schmit Report has no official status and was not 
agreed to by all the EU Member States, nevertheless it is of persuasive authority. The report is to 
be found in an appendix to the books mentioned above. 
7 Recital 4. For an implicit distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forum shopping see the opinion 
of Advocate General Colomber in Staubitz-Schreiber  - Case -1/04 [2006] ECR I-701, [71]-[72]. 
8 Article 3(1). 
immediate, full and unqualified recognition throughout the EU.9 While secondary insolvency 
proceedings may be opened in States where the debtor has an ‘establishment’10 the effect of these 
proceedings is however limited to assets within the particular State. According to Article 4, the 
law of the State where insolvency proceedings are opened, governs the conduct and effect of the 
proceedings and the article 4 sets out a number of matters that are specifically subject to the law 
governing the opening of the proceedings.  These matters include the assets which form part of 
the estate; the powers of the liquidator; rules governing the lodging, verification and admission of 
claims; and the priority ranking of creditors. Articles 5-15 however, set out a whole host of 
exceptions to the Article 4 general rule.  
Looking at the European Insolvency Regulation from the perspective of international insolvency 
principle, its general approach appears to be ‘universalism’, albeit tempered or modified by 
pragmatic considerations. The universalist philosophy suggests that there should be a single 
insolvency proceeding in respect of a debtor which covers all the debtor’s assets wherever 
situated and that applies in respect of all the debtor’s legal relationships.11 Article 4 of the 
Regulation reflects a universalist approach but the exceptions contained in Articles 5-15 cast a 
different light. Another modification to the universalist philosophy in the Regulation comes from 
the fact that secondary insolvency proceedings may be opened in respect of a debtor and these 
                                          
9 Articles 16 and 25. 
10 Article 3(2). 
11 For a discussion of universalism versus territorialism see G McCormack, “Universalism in 
Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law’” (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325. 
See also JL Westbrook, “Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum” (1991) 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 457; L LoPucki, “Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach” (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review  696; S 
Franken, “Three Principles of Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A Review” (2005) 11 
European Law Journal 232.  
proceedings do not serve simply as mechanisms for the more convenient collection of assets and 
their remission to the liquidator in the principal proceedings. The secondary proceedings are 
subject to the law of the State that opens the secondary proceedings which will apply, inter alia, 
to the distribution of the assets subject to the secondary proceedings.12 The role of secondary 
proceedings in the context of Regulation acknowledges implicitly the alternative to 
‘universalism’; namely ‘territorialism’ which suggests that separate insolvency proceedings may 
be opened in any State where a debtor has assets and that ‘local’ assets should be in principle be 
set aside for the benefit of ‘local’ creditors. 13   
Apart however, from a rather bald statement that the proper functioning of the internal market 
requires a cross-border insolvency initiative there is nothing much in the preamble about higher 
level objectives.  The Commission has painted the background to the proposed amendments with 
a far broader and bolder brush. The amendments are stated to be with a view to ensuring a 
smooth functioning of the internal market; its resilience in economic crises and the survival of 
businesses. Reference is made to the Europe 2020 strategy and the EU's current political 
priorities to promote economic recovery and sustainable growth, a higher investment rate and the 
preservation of employment.14  Language in the proposed new preamble refers to the extension of 
the regulation to proceedings which “promote the rescue of an economically viable debtor in 
order to help sound companies to survive and give a second chance to entrepreneurs. It should 
                                          
12 This was made clear in Re Alitalia Ltd [2011] EWHC 15; [2011] 1 WLR 2049. 
13 For a defence of provisions ring-fencing assets for the benefit of ‘local’ creditors see the paper 
by the Singapore Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, “Cross-Border Insolvency issues affecting 
Singapore” (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 413,  419. 
14 See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposals at para 1.2. 
notably extend to proceedings which provide for the restructuring of a debtor at a pre-insolvency 
stage or which leave the existing management in place.”15 Underlying the Commission agenda is 
the assumption that in a business there is a surplus of going concern value over liquidation value 
and that this going concern surplus is best captured if the business is, in some way, restructured 
rather than the assets of the business being sold off to the highest bidder. 16 This assumption is 
questionable in that the best outcome may be the sale of the economically viable part of a 
company’s business with the ‘bad bits’ being left behind and liquidated.  
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code is often cited as the model to which European 
restructuring laws should aspire.17  Chapter 11 has as a goal the preparation and confirmation of a 
restructuring plan.18 Prominent US commentators suggest19 that in ”the pantheon of extraordinary 
laws that have shaped the American economy and society and then echoed throughout the world, 
                                          
15 New recital 3. 
16 On different conceptions of corporate rescue see V Finch, “Corporate Rescue: A game of three 
halves” (2012) 32 Legal Studies 302; “Corporate rescue in a world of debt” [2008] Journal of 
Business Law 756. 
17 See M Brouwer, “Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy Law” (2006) 22 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 5; A Tilley, “European Restructuring: Clarifying Trans-Atlantic 
Misconceptions” [2005] Journal of Private Equity 99; C Pochet, “Institutional Complementarities 
within Corporate Governance Systems: A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy Rules” (2002) 6 
Journal of Management and Governance 343.  
18 Bank of America v 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership (1999) 526 US 434.  See also HR Rep 
No 595, 95th Congress, Ist Session 220 (1977) and US v Whiting Pools Inc (1983) 462 US 198 at 
203: “In proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled 
enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future …By permitting 
reorganisation, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy 
creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners… Congress presumed that the assets of 
the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap’”.   
19 See E Warren & JL Westbrook, "The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics" (2009) 
107 Michigan Law Review 603 at 604.  The American Bankruptcy Institute has  established a 
commission to review Chapter 11 with a view to advancing proposals for legislative reform – see 
www.commission.abi.org  
Chapter 11 … deserves a prominent place. Based on the idea that a failing business can be 
reshaped into a successful operation, Chapter 11 was perhaps a predictable creation from a people 
whose majority religion embraces the idea of life from death.” Restructuring mechanisms, 
including Chapter 11, are designed to keep a business alive so as to preserve this additional going 
concern value. There is however, another view that if a company encounters economic difficulties 
the most effective solution may be to shut it down. 20   For instance, if a company is producing 
goods and services for which there is no ready market then there may be no point in leaving it in 
existence.  There seems little merit in saving a dog food company if the company is producing 
food that the animals do not like.21 Putting ailing companies on a life support machine may in 
fact harm the sector of the economy in which they operate.  It makes competitors suffer by 
forcing them to compete in crowded markets with rivals that are restructured and have their debts 
reduced but which are ultimately inefficient. There is a move therefore, to a new ‘Chapter 11’ 
with a greater emphasis on sales of the debtor’s business as a going concern rather than on 
restructurings in the traditional sense.22 
There is a bit of a gap however, between the rhetoric of the European Commission and the 
reality. Despite the rhetoric, the Commission proposals are essentially modest and procedural at 
                                          
20 See C Adams, “An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations” (1991) 20 Hofstra 
Law Review 117, 133 “[M]ost assets are probably not firm-specific, and so, most insolvent 
corporations will not have substantially greater going concern than liquidation values and, 
consequently, will not be good candidates for an effective reorganization.”  
21 See generally M White, “Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms” (1994) 72 
Washington University Law Quarterly 1319; “The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision” (1989) 3 
Journal of  Economic Perspectives 129. 
22 See, for example,  K Ayotte and DA Skeel, “Bankruptcy or Bailouts” (2010) 35 Journal of 
Corporate Law 469, 477 “roughly two-thirds of all large bankruptcy outcomes involve a sale of 
the firm, rather than a traditional negotiated reorganization in which debt is converted to equity 
through the reorganization plan.” 
least so far as revision of the Regulation is concerned though, in fairness to the Commission, it 
should be pointed out that they are part of a broader package of measures including a 
Communication  on “ A new European approach to business failure and insolvency”.23  
Essentially, the Regulation reform proposals extend Europe-wide recognition under the 
Regulation to a greater range of restructuring proceedings.  This extension will now be 
considered. 
B. Extension of the Regulation to cover ‘pre-insolvency’ procedures 
 
Currently, Article 1(1) provides that the Regulation applies to collective insolvency proceedings 
involving the partial or total disinvestment of the debtor and the appointment of a liquidator 
(Art 1). Article 2 goes on to state that for the purposes of the Regulation ‘insolvency proceedings’ 
shall mean the collective proceedings referred to in Art 1(1), which proceedings are listed in 
Annex A.  The European court said in Bank Handlowy24  that once proceedings are listed in 
Annex A to the Regulation, they must be regarded as coming within the scope of the Regulation. 
‘Inclusion in the list has the direct, binding effect attaching to the provisions of a regulation.’ 
Moreover, in Ulf Kazimierz Radziejewski25the European court suggested that the 
Regulation applied only to the proceedings listed in the annex.26 Therefore a form of Swedish 
debt relief procedure considered in the case did not fall within the Regulation as it was not 
                                          
23 COM (2012) 742. See also European Commission Press Release of 5th July 2013 - 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-655_en.htm. 
24 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v. Christianapol sp. z o.o. (Case C-116/11). paras  33–35. See 
also para 49 of the opinion of Advocate General Kokott. 
25 Case C-461/11 – judgment 8th November 2012. The court however also pointed out that the 
procedure did not entail the divestment of the debtor and therefore could not be classified as 
an insolvency procedure within the meaning of Article 1. 
26 Para 24. 
included in the Annex.   
 
The annex may be over-inclusive in that it covers procedures that, strictly speaking, are ot 
collective insolvency proceedings entailing the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidator. It may also be under-inclusive in that certain procedures in some 
countries may satisfy the Art 1(1) definition but are not listed in the Annex. There is also a time 
lag in that a State may introduce a new insolvency procedure but some time elapses before it 
appears in the Annex.27  
Under the proposed new regime the Regulation would apply to apply to ‘collective judicial or 
administrative proceedings, including interim proceedings, which are based on a law relating to 
insolvency or adjustment of debt and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, 
reorganisation or liquidation, (a) the debtor is totally or partially divested of his assets and a 
liquidator is appointed, or (b) the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or 
supervision by a court.’28 
This proposal would certainly allow a wider range of procedures to be listed in Annex A but there 
is no intention to alter the decisive effect attributed to inclusion in the list nor the procedure 
whereby a Member State notifies the Commission of what procedures it wants included in the 
list.  There is however a proposal whereby the Commission would examine whether a particular 
procedure notified to it satisfies the definition, and should be included in the Annex.29  The 
Commission would make the decision on inclusion rather than the Member States, acting through 
                                          
27There is a procedure under Article 45 whereby the Council, acting by qualified majority, may 
amend the Annex. 
28 New Article 1(1). 
29 New Article 45.  The Lehne 2 report, see fn 1, at p 48 suggests however that it is not for 
Member States to decide which proceedings fall under Annex A and if the Article 1 conditions are 
met, then “Member States need to notify”. 
the Council, as under the present regime.  This amounts to a transfer of power to the Commission 
at the expense of Member states and it is questionable whether it will lead to more efficient or 
accurate outcomes unless there is a corresponding increase in the resources available to the 
Commission.  
As far as the UK is concerned, the main point of contention in respect of the expanded definition 
of ‘insolvency proceedings’ in the proposed new Regulation is in relation to schemes of 
arrangement.  Schemes of arrangement under the UK Companies Act have proved a popular 
restructuring tool for large corporate debt and for large companies30, including foreign-registered 
companies. 31  They serve in effect as a form of ‘debtor-in-possession’ restructuring. The scheme 
procedure enables a company to enter into a compromise or arrangement with any class of 
creditors, or members. In this way, the capital structure of a company in financial difficulties may 
be rearranged.  The arrangement may have various elements, either alone or in combination, such 
as extending the maturity of loans; partial debt write off or converting debt into other instruments 
including equity in the company. The statute requires that a majority in number representing 75% 
in value of the class of creditors or members affected must accept the scheme. The court must 
also sanction a scheme as being fair to the creditors as a whole.32  Once the statutory conditions 
are fulfilled, the scheme becomes binding even in respect of those creditors who did not give 
their consent.33  The statutory provisions enable unanimous lender consent provisions in loan 
                                          
30 See generally on schemes G O’Dea, J Long and A Smyth Schemes of Arrangement Law and 
Practice (Oxford, OUP, 2012). 
31 See Re Seat Pagine Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686; Primacom Holdings GmbH v Credit 
Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746, [2013] BCC 201; Re Rodenstock GmbH  [2011] EWHC 1104, 
[2012] BCC 459 and see generally Look Chan Ho, “Making and enforcing international schemes 
of arrangement” (2011) 26 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 434.  
32 On “fairness” see Re Telewest Communications [2004] EWHC 924, [2004] BCC 342. 
33 For details see Part 26 of the UK Companies Act 2006.  As well as being used for the 
restructuring of company debt, schemes are also used in takeover situations as a means for the 
compulsory acquisition of shares. 
agreements and, more generally, objections to a restructuring by minority lenders to be 
overcome.  
 
The fact however that schemes of arrangement are not listed under the Insolvency Regulation 
means that they are not entitled to the benefits of automatic EU wide recognition under Articles 
16, 17 and 25 of the Regulation.  On the other hand, the UK courts have a wider jurisdictional 
base in that they may sanction schemes where the relevant foreign company has a ‘sufficient 
connection’ with the UK, even though its COMI may not be in the UK.  Under Part 26 of the 
Companies Act 2006 dealing with schemes, the court has jurisdiction to sanction a scheme if the 
company is liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act.  By virtue of s 221 of the Insolvency 
Act, a winding up order may be made in respect of a foreign registered company but established 
case law suggests that the jurisdiction to exercise winding up should only be exercised if the 
company is deemed to have a sufficient connection with the UK.  In cases like Re Drax 
Holdings Ltd34 the courts have applied the ‘sufficient connection’ test in respect of schemes. For 
instance, in Re Rodenstock GmbH35  a sufficient connection with the UK was found to exist by 
virtue of the fact that the credit facilities extended to the company contained English choice of 
law clause and jurisdiction clauses and also by expert evidence to the effect that the German 
courts would recognise the English court order. 
The reason that schemes of arrangement are not listed under the Insolvency Regulation is that 
they are not necessarily a collective procedure nor an insolvency procedure.  Schemes, for 
instance, may be used as a takeover mechanism in respect of solvent companies and even in the 
restricting context they may only involve a few debtors rather than debtors or bondholders as a 
                                          
34 [2003] EWHC 2743, [2004] 1 WLR 1049. 
35 [2011] EWHC 1104, [2012] BCC 459.  See also Primacom Holdings GmbH v Credit Agricole 
[2011] EWHC 3746, [2013] BCC 201 and Re Seat Pagine Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686. 
whole. The expanded definition of ‘insolvency proceedings’ provides an opportunity to revisit the 
issue of whether or not schemes should be listed under the Regulation. In accordance with the 
revised definition, one might argue that schemes of arrangement are based on a law relating to the 
adjustment of debts in which, for the purpose of adjustment of debt, the assets and affairs of the 
debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court.  They are also judicial proceedings.  While 
they are not invariably ‘collective’ proceedings, it is not clear what is meant by collective 
proceedings for the purpose of the Regulation and it should be possible to limit the application of 
the Regulation to certain types of schemes. 
It is unlikely however, that listing of schemes under the Regulation would be welcomed by UK 
restructuring professionals. On the one hand, there would be automatic EU wide recognition of 
schemes instead of the present piecemeal recognition but it would limit the jurisdiction of the 
English courts to sanction schemes to cases where a company had its centre of main interests in 
the UK.  No longer could the courts apply a more flexible ‘sufficient connection’ test.  This 
would surely detract from the attractiveness of the UK as the restructuring venue of choice for 
large companies.  It might limit the financial and other opportunities of UK-based professionals.  
More seriously it might make large corporate restructuring more difficult to accomplish since not 
all jurisdictions may have the same advantageous laws as the UK that enable ‘hold-outs’ among 
minority creditors to be overcome. 
 
C. Jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings 
The Regulation gives jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings to the State where the 
debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI).  In the case of companies, there is a presumption 
that COMI is the same as the place of the registered office but this is only a presumption and it 
may be rebutted.  The only other guidance on COMI in the Regulation comes in recital 13 of the 
preamble which states that the COMI “should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts 
the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third 
parties”.  There has been considerable criticism of the COMI concept and its place at the heart of 
the Regulation.36  Certainly it is fact sensitive and capable of varying judicial interpretations 
particularly when, for example, the corporate headquarters, principal assets, place of main 
operations and place of incorporation are all in different countries.37  
It would be possible to reduce uncertainty by replacing the COMI test for main insolvency 
proceedings with an incorporation, or seat of registration test, or, less radically, by making the 
COMI equals place of registered office presumption rebuttable only in wholly exceptional 
circumstances.38  There are at least two drawbacks with this approach.  Firstly, the COMI test is 
mirrored in other international instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency and a unilateral departure from the COMI yardstick by the EU would cause 
disharmony and friction in the process of international insolvency co-operation.39  Secondly, 
while within the frontiers of the EU it may be somewhat pejorative to use the expression ‘letter 
box incorporation jurisdictions’, a company may have little or no economic connection with its 
place of incorporation or registration.  The vast bulk of its activities may be carried out 
elsewhere.  In these circumstances, it seems perverse to give the place of incorporation the 
                                          
36 See generally M Szydlo, “Prevention of Forum Shopping in European Insolvency Law” (2010) 
11 European Business Organization Law Review 253; W-G Ringe, “Forum Shopping under the 
EU Insolvency Regulation” (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law Review 579; G 
McCormack, “Jurisdictional competition and forum shopping in insolvency proceedings” (2009) 
68 Cambridge Law Journal 213. 
37 L LoPucki in “The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy” (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 2216, 2217 has gone so far as to say that the COMI concept is 
intentionally vague and practically meaningless. 
38 See generally J Armour, “Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus 
Regulatory Competition” (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 369; H Eidenmüller, “Free Choice 
in International Company Insolvency Law in Europe” (2005) 6 European Business Organization 
Law Review 423. 
39 Article 16 and see Re Stanford International Bank Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 137, [2011] Ch 33.  
jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings particularly when the courts of that State may 
be ill-equipped in terms of convenience and resources to carry out the task. 
The Commission’s proposals stick with the  COMI concept but try to put some more flesh on the 
bones by introducing a statutory codification of the case law from the European Court 
particularly in the Interedil decision.40 The proposals suggest a weakening, rather than a 
strengthening, of the COMI presumption.  The new language states that the COMI/ registered 
office presumption may be rebutted where “a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant 
factors establishes, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, that the company’s actual 
centre of management and supervision and of the management of its interests” is located in 
another State.41 
 
Under the Regulation, for a party that is advantaged by the opening of insolvency proceedings in 
a particular country rather than others, there is an incentive to file proceedings first and then to 
ask questions later, if at all. The Regulation creates a figurative race to the court house door 
though the notion of a ‘court’ under the Insolvency Regulation is something of a misnomer since 
it extends to administrative bodies and even insolvency practitioners (IPs) competent to open 
insolvency proceedings under the provisions of a particular national law.42  In marginal cases 
where the COMI of a company is debatable, the competent authorities of a Member State first 
seised of an insolvency matter may well be inclined to assert jurisdiction.43  Under the 
Commission proposals, a new Article 3b will impose a duty on courts and other bodies competent 
to open insolvency proceedings to examine ex officio whether or not they have jurisdiction in the 
                                          
40 Case C-396/09; [2011] BPIR 1639.  
41 New recital 13a. 
42 See the definition in Article 2(d) and see also Re Salvage Association [2003] EWHC 1028, 
[2004] 1 WLR 174, [20]-[21]. 
43 Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd v Exner [2006] EWHC 2594, [2007] BCC 127. 
particular case.  It is questionable however whether this requirement adds anything new and 
whether it amounts to anything more than an additional bureaucratic requirement – in other 
words, a “box-ticking” exercise.  
The new article also gives any “creditor or interested party who has his habitual residence, 
domicile or registered office in a Member State other than the State of the opening of 
proceedings” the right to challenge the decision opening main proceedings. The court opening the 
main proceedings is required to inform known creditors “of the decision in due time in order to 
enable them to challenge it."  This provision opens up the possibility that foreign creditors might 
have greater rights than local creditors to appeal against decisions opening insolvency 
proceedings.  This state of affairs appears to be anomalous. 
 
1. Insolvency-related actions 
 
The Commission proposals also suggest measures of clarification in respect of insolvency-related 
actions acknowledging that the “delimitation between the Brussels I Regulation and the 
[Insolvency] Regulation is one of the most controversial issues relating to cross-border 
insolvencies.”44 It proposes a codification of the decision in Seagon v Deko45 s  that in the 
revised Regulation there would be a clear statement that courts opening insolvency proceedings 
also have jurisdiction in respect of actions that derive directly from the insolvency proceedings 
                                          
44 See  Report from the Commission on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 
of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings COM(2012) 743 final at p 10. 
45 Case C-339/07 [2009] ECR 1-767. See on the decision L Carballo Pineiro, “Vis attractiva 
concursus in the European Union: its development by the European Court of Justice” InDret 
3/2010 at pp 1-23 and more generally A Dutta “Jurisdiction for insolvency-related proceedings 
caught between European legislation” [2008] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
88. 
and are closely linked with them.46 This clarification is welcome but there is no guidance on what 
is a ‘directly and closely linked action’.  Such guidance need not be exhaustive nor prejudice the 
generality of the term but it might follow the example of Article 4(2) which sets out conflict of 
law rules for determining the matters that are subject to the law of the State that opens the 
insolvency proceedings.  
The Commission has also proposed that a liquidator should be allowed to bring insolvency 
related actions in the defendant’s country of domicile as well as in the insolvency forum.47  This 
would allow a liquidator to couple an insolvency-related action with, for example, an action 
based on the duties of directors under company law.48 There is much merit in this proposal for, at 
the moment, a liquidator is faced with the prospect and the costs of potentially having to bring 
proceedings against the same defendant in two different countries. Proceedings under insolvency 
law to set aside pre-insolvency transactions, on the basis that they are detrimental to the general 
body of creditors, are insolvency-related.49  Therefore they should be brought in the State where 
the insolvency proceedings are opened whereas actions to recover company assets in a 
                                          
46 On whether the Insolvency Regulation applies where the defendant in an insolvency-related 
action is resident outside the EU see the preliminary reference to the European court in Schmidt v 
Hertel- Case C-328/12 The Advocate General suggests that it does but the Virgos-Schmit report, 
see fn 6,  at paras 11 and 44 suggests otherwise. 
47  See Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on 
insolvency proceedings COM(2012) 744 final at p 7. 
48 The proposal adds that insolvency related actions may only be brought in a court of the 
defendant’s domicile if that court has jurisdiction under the Brussels 1 Regulation.  But it could 
be argued that that court has no jurisdiction by virtue of the bankruptcy and analogous 
proceedings exception under the Brussels 1 Regulation, in which case the proposal means little in 
practice. The Hess/Oberhammer/Pfeiffer external evaluation of the Regulation is much clearer on 
this point.  It states that the liquidator should be entitled to file the insolvency-related action 
optionally before the courts of the EU state in which the defendant is domiciled, if and to the 
extent that, the latter courts have jurisdiction over the connected claim under the Brussels 1 
Regulation. - JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4 - at pp 22 and 219-220. 
 
49 Seagon v Deko Case C-339/07 [2009] ECR 1-767. 
defendant’s possession should be brought in the State where the defendant is domiciled.50  This 
seems costly and inconvenient. It would minimize transaction costs if the actions could be 
combined and heard together in the same State. 
 
D. Improving the coordination of main and secondary proceedings 
The Insolvency Regulation departs from Universalist ideals by permitting the opening of 
secondary insolvency proceedings applying to assets in a State where the debtor has an 
“establishment”. Local law applies to these secondary proceedings including local priority rules 
in respect of the distribution of assets.51 Under a truly universal regime the primary job of a 
liquidator in secondary proceedings would be merely to collect assets and hand them over to the 
liquidator in the main proceeding who would then distribute them in accordance with the law 
governing the main proceedings.  The opening of secondary proceedings protects the position of 
local preferential creditors whose claims would be regarded as non-preferential under the law of 
the main proceedings. 
The Regulation contains a number of provisions to regulate the relationship between main and 
secondary proceedings.  Firstly, any ‘surplus’ that remains after payment of all claims that have 
been lodged in the secondary proceedings must be passed to the Insolvency Practitioner (IP) in 
the main proceedings but, in practice, there may be nothing left after claims of local preferential 
creditors have been met. Secondly, there is a duty imposed on the IPs in the main and secondary 
proceedings to communicate promptly with one another.52 Thirdly, secondary proceedings can be 
stayed for up to 3 months at the request of the IP in the main proceedings, although the court in 
the secondary proceedings granting the stay may require the IP in the main insolvency 
                                          
50 Byers v Yacht Bull Corp [2010] EWHC 133, [2010] BCC 368. 
51 Articles 2(i) and 28. 
52 Article 31. 
proceedings to take any suitable measure to guarantee the interests of the creditors in the 
secondary proceedings and of individual classes of creditors.53 A request by the liquidator for a 
stay may be rejected only if it is manifestly of no interest to the creditors in the main proceedings. 
The stay may be extended for further three-month periods at a time but the stay may be lifted by 
the court where it no longer appears justified having regard to the interests of creditors. Fourthly, 
a composition in the secondary proceedings may not become final without the consent of the 
liquidator in the main proceeding. Such consent cannot be withheld however, if the financial 
interests of the creditors in the main proceeding are not affected by the composition. 
 
The opening of secondary proceedings complicates the IP’s task in the main proceedings.  Apart 
from having to deal with another independent office holder, creditors in other countries are now 
in a stronger bargaining position.  For example, an IP who is trying to formulate and implement 
plans for the sale of the business as a whole could find the plans frustrated by creditors in a 
particular State who take the view that a secondary liquidation in that State would better serve 
their interests. The English courts have tried to minimize the potential disruption caused by the 
opening of secondary insolvency proceedings through two mechanisms.  The first is the notion of 
‘synthetic’ secondary proceedings. In Re Collins and Aikman54 it was held that the UK 
Insolvency Act was sufficiently flexible so that UK IPs should observe promises made to 
creditors in other EU States that local priorities would be respected in return for not opening 
secondary proceedings in the other States.  In effect, the creditors got the benefits of having 
secondary proceedings without the trouble of going to open them.  The secondary proceedings 
                                          
53 Article 33. 
54 Re Collins and Aikman Europe SA [2006] EWHC 1343, [2006] BCC 861.  
were ‘synthetic’ rather than actual. Secondly, in Re Nortel Networks SA55 a procedure was put in 
place to try to ensure that the IP in the main proceeding had a ‘voice’ on any decision to open 
secondary proceedings. The administrators of various companies in the Nortel group were 
granted an order requesting other EU courts to give notice of applications to open secondary 
insolvency proceedings in respect of Nortel companies and to allow them to make submissions 
on such applications. The administrators were of the view that the best option to maximise value 
for Nortel’s creditors was through a coordinated restructuring of the entire group. Accordingly, 
they wished to avoid secondary insolvency proceedings on the basis this was likely to impede a 
global restructuring and reduce the value ultimately realised for the benefit of the creditors. 
While IPs and courts, particularly in the UK, have devised imaginative solutions to particular 
issues thrown up the Regulation,56 one insuperable roadblock is presented by the fact that while 
main insolvency proceedings may be either liquidation or restructuring proceedings, secondary 
proceedings opened after commencement of main insolvency proceedings can only be liquidation 
proceedings.57 One of the drafters of the Regulation has explained that limiting secondary 
proceedings to liquidations was part of the overall compromise which led to the instrument 
gaining general acceptance. “By opening a local liquidation proceeding, Member States can pull 
an emergency brake if they feel that unlimited recognition of foreign rehabilitation proceedings is 
unfair to their (or to their local creditors') interests.”58  Nevertheless, the limitation may make an 
overall business sale or restructuring more difficult to accomplish. 59 
                                          
55 [2009] EWHC 206, [2009] BCC 343. 
56 See Commission Report COM (2012) 743 final at p 14. 
57 Article 3(3). 
58 See M Balz, “The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings” (1996) American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 485, 520. 
59  For criticism see I Fletcher Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed 
2005), 371. 
The Commission’s proposals retain a role for secondary proceedings – there does not appear to 
have been serious consideration given to the idea of doing away with secondary proceedings and 
entrusting all power to the liquidator in the main proceedings.  The proposals however, contain 
measures to improve the coordination of main and secondary proceedings and generalize and 
‘Europeanise’ some of the practices developed by the English Courts in cases like Re Collins and 
Aikman and Re Nortel Networks.  Firstly, the court seised of a request to open secondary 
proceedings may turn down the request if the IP in the main proceedings gives an undertaking 
that the distribution and priority rights enjoyed by local creditors if secondary proceedings had 
been opened will be respected in the main proceedings.60 According to the Commission, such a 
practice is currently not possible under the law of many Member States and the proposal 
introduces a new rule of substantive law.61 Secondly, the court seised with a request to open 
secondary proceedings is required to hear the liquidator of the main proceedings before making 
its decision.62  Thirdly, the proposal abolishes the requirement that secondary proceedings have to 
be liquidation proceedings.  Fourthly, the proposal extends the obligation to cooperate to the 
courts involved in the main and secondary proceedings.63 “Consequently, courts will be obliged 
to cooperate and communicate with each other; moreover, liquidators will have to cooperate and 
communicate with the court in the other Member State involved in the proceedings.”64 Under the 
current Regulation, there is no express duty of co-operation between courts opening main and 
secondary insolvency proceedings but there have been suggestions that such a duty should be 
implied.65 
                                          
60 New Articles 18(1) and 29a(2). 
61 See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposal at para 3.1.3. 
62 New Article 29(1). 
63 New Article 31a. 
64 Explanatory memorandum at para 3.1.3. 
65See Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Oxford, OUP, 
In the regime under the revised Regulation there will still be a role for secondary proceedings.66 
Therefore, it clearly makes sense to try to improve the coordination of main and secondary 
proceedings while acknowledging and paying respect to the dominant role of the main 
proceedings.  The main and secondary proceedings should be coordinated rather than work in 
opposition and conflict.  To this end, it is useful and beneficial to provide courts in other Member 
States with direct authorisation to implement the kind of beneficial practices that found favour 
with the English courts in Collins & Aikman and Nortel. It is also useful to spell out an express 
duty of cooperation between the courts opening main and secondary proceedings rather than 
leaving it to the realm of implication and inference.  The courts in different countries may not 
necessarily draw the same inference. Moreover, given the importance now attached to business 
and corporate restructuring, confining secondary proceedings to liquidation proceedings seems 
regressive and the Commission proposals suggest a welcome change.67 
 
E. Groups of Companies 
 
The Insolvency Regulation does not have any provisions on groups of companies, whether of a 
substantive or procedural kind.68  In determining whether insolvency proceedings may be opened, 
                                                                                                                                         
2nd ed, 2009) at para 8.362. 
66 In one respect the revised Regulation would extend the possibilities for opening secondary 
proceedings through providing in a new Article 3(3) that the relevant time for assessing whether 
the debtor possesses an establishment within another Member State is the date of the opening of 
the main proceedings – see also the new recital 19b.  This provision would reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Trustees of the Olympic Airlines  Pension Scheme v Olympic Airlines SA 
[2013] EWCA Civ 643 which holds that the relevant date for determining the existence of an 
‘establishment’ is the date of the application to open the secondary proceedings. 
67 According to the explanatory memorandum at para 3.1.3 this “ensures that the opening of 
secondary proceedings does not automatically thwart the rescue or restructuring of a debtor as a 
whole.” 
68 See generally I Mevorach, “The ‘Home Country’ of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing 
the focus of the inquiry is on a particular individual company and the COMI of that company, 
and not on its status as a member of a group of companies. The Regulation ignores the wider 
group perspective though some of the case law from Member States has adopted an “integrated 
economic unit” approach.  This approach looks at the affairs of the group of companies as a 
whole and may lead to the conclusion that related companies have their COMI in the same State 
even though the companies may have been incorporated in different States. According to a 
French Court69 the ”analysis of the case law of the various Member States shows that courts 
adopt a pragmatic approach tending to allow streamlining of strongly integrated groups of 
companies.” The European court judgment in the Eurofood case70 however firmly focuses the 
inquiry on the individual company holding that “where a company carries on its business in the 
territory of the Member State where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that its 
economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not 
enough to rebut the presumption laid down by the Regulation.”  In other words, the presumption 
that the COMI is the place of the registered office prevails. 
More recently, in the Mediasucre case71 the European court rejected the proposition that a single 
COMI could automatically be inferred from the fact that the property of two companies has been 
intermixed.  The court said that such intermixing could be organised from two management and 
supervision centres in two different Member States. 
In dealing with the insolvency of related companies four different approaches are possible.  The 
most interventionist strategy is that of substantive consolidation and to pool the assets of related 
                                                                                                                                         
Insolvency” (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 427; “Centralising 
Insolvencies of Pan-European Corporate Groups: a Creditor’s Dream or Nightmare?” [2006] 
Journal of Business Law 468.  
69 Re MPOTEC Gmbh [2006] BCC 681 at 687. 
70 Case C-341/04 Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR 1-03813. 
71 Case C-191/10; [2012] All ER (EC) 239. 
companies.  As a general proposition this approach is unlikely to pass muster because it 
disregards the principle that a company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its controllers 
or constituent shareholders.  This principle is at the heart of most European legal systems and was 
recently reaffirmed by the UK Supreme Court.72  Some countries however, including Ireland, as 
an exception to the ‘separate corporate entity’ principle permit the pooling of assets of related 
companies in certain limited circumstances. 73 Even in the UK this principle is not unknown, for 
in a case arising out of the collapse of Bank of Credit and Commerce International in the early 
1990s – Re BCCI (No 2)74– it was held that pursuant to s 167 of the Insolvency Act 1986 the 
court could approve a ‘pooling’ agreement where the assets of insolvent companies were so 
confused that it was impossible to define the assets of each company. 
A second, milder, approach is that of procedural consolidation, whether done on a de facto or de 
jure basis. In the UK, this result can be achieved by the appointment of the same IP to two or 
more members of the same corporate group. In cases like in Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd75this approach 
was effectively adopted in respect of cases under the Insolvency Regulation with the court 
holding all the members of a group of companies had their COMI in the UK despite 
incorporation in different countries. A variant of the procedural consolidation approach is 
employed in the US and this allows a bankruptcy filing in a district other than where a company 
has its centre of main interests.  Under the US code76 a bankruptcy case may be filed where a 
company had its domicile, residence, or principal place of business in the US or where an affiliate 
company had already filed a bankruptcy case.  This provision was used in the General Motors 
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International Corp  [2013] UKSC 5, [2013] 2 WLR 398. 
73 See s 141 of the Irish Companies Act 1990. On the US position see D Baird, “Substantive 
Consolidation Today” (2005) 47 Boston College Law Review 5. 
74 [1992] BCC 715. 
75 [2003] BCC 562. 
76 28 U.S.C. § 1408 
case to facilitate a bankruptcy filing by General Motors in New York even though the company 
had its headquarters and main operations in the US State of Michigan.  General Motors could 
‘piggyback’ on an earlier bankruptcy filing by a small associated company in New York.77   
Effectively the US venue rules allow for the insolvencies of a large group of associated 
companies to be administered from the same location. 78 
 
A third, even milder, approach is that of procedural cooperation with the insolvencies of different 
members of a corporate group administered in different States but with the separate IPs being 
subject to a duty to cooperate and given a role in the different proceedings. The final approach, 
and least interventionist strategy, would be simply to disregard the fact that the companies are 
related and to proceed with separate insolvency proceedings in respect of each company.  This 
approach is likely to be value destructive because the economic affairs of group members may be 
so entangled that meaningful returns can only be achieved through a coordinated group 
restructuring and/or sale of assets.  
In its proposals the European Commission acknowledges the virtues of the second, procedural 
consolidation, approach.  It states that its proposals are not intende  to preclude the “existing 
practice in relation to highly integrated groups of companies to determine that the centre of main 
                                          
77 See Financial Times, 2 June 2009,  27.  See generally on the big ‘car’ cases in the US D Baird, 
“Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations" (2012) 4 Journal of Legal Analysis 271; S 
Lubben, “No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context” (2009) 82 American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal 531; M Roe and D Skeel, “Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy” (2010) 108 
Michigan Law Review 727. 
78 For vociferous criticism of bankruptcy forum shopping in the US see L M LoPucki Courting 
Failure: How Competition For Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 2005)  but for rebuttals of the LoPucki thesis see (2006) 54 Buffalo 
Law Review and also K  Ayotte and D Skeel (2006) 73 University of Chicago Law Review 425. 
See now S Parikh, “Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy” [2013] Connecticut Law Review 
28. 
interests of all members of the group is located in one and the same place and, consequently, to 
open proceedings only in a single jurisdiction.”79 
The main thrust of the Commission proposals is to extend the principles of cooperation 
applicable in the context of main and secondary proceedings to insolvency proceedings involving 
different members of the same group of companies.  Both IPs and courts are obliged to cooperate 
but this cooperation may take different forms depending on the circumstances of the case. IPs 
should exchange relevant information and cooperate in the elaboration of a rescue or 
restructuring plan where this is appropriate. Cooperation by way of protocols is explicitly 
mentioned and the Commission suggests that this reference both acknowledges the practical 
importance of these instruments and further promotes their use.80 Courts can cooperate, in 
particular, by the exchange of information and by coordinating the administration and supervision 
of the assets and affairs of the group companies as well as coordinating the conduct of hearings 
and the approval of protocols. 
The proposal also gives an IP standing in relation to insolvency proceedings affecting another 
member of the same group. In particular, the liquidator has a right to be heard in these other 
proceedings; to request a stay of the other proceedings and to propose a rescue or restructuring 
plan in accordance with the law applicable to those proceedings. The IP also has the right to 
attend and participate in a meeting of creditors.81 The Commission suggests that these procedural 
tools will enable the IP with the biggest interest in a successful group restructuring to submit a 
coordinated restructuring plan even if this plan does not meet with the approval of the IPs of 
                                          
79 See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposals COM (2012) 744 final, 
para 3.1.5. 
80 See new Article 42a and para 3.1.5 of the explanatory memorandum. 
81 New Article 42d. 
other group members.82  The proposals however, also open up the possibility of procedural chaos 
with different restructuring plans being put forward by different IPs. Practical arrangements will 
have to be worked out to ensure that this potentially valuable procedural tool does not become an 
arena for personal wrangling and conflict and an instrument for increased transaction costs. 
Another point concerns the definition of members of a corporate group.  It is defined as a number 
of companies consisting of parent and subsidiary companies. A parent company is defined in 
terms of control of a majority of voting rights in another company or membership of the other 
company plus the power to appoint or remove a majority of members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory board or the ability to exercise a dominant influence.83  It has been 
argued that this definition is too limited because it fails to capture and reflect the myriad forms in 
which corporate groups are now structured.84 
The cooperation approach set out in the Commission proposals have been taken a stage further in 
the Lehne 2 report prepared by the Committee of Legal Affairs of the European Parliament.85  
This report suggests the possibility of opening group coordination proceedings that would sit 
alongside the separate insolvency proceedings opened in respect of members of the group of 
companies.  The coordination proceedings would allow for the appointment of a coordinator.  
Not only would the coordinator act as a sort of ‘super-mediator’ between the different IPs but he 
also has the task of “presenting a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and 
recommends a comprehensive set of measures”86 that are appropriate to an integrated resolution 
of the group insolvency. 
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85 See Lehne 2 report, fn 1, at pp 39-43 and 47-48. 
86 Ibid at p 39. 
While it can hardly be doubted that the amicable settlement of disputes between IPs is beneficial, 
the particular scheme envisaged by Lehne may not offer much of an improvement on the 
Commission proposals and it may in fact contribute to further costs and delay for at least three 
reasons.  For a start, there is a question about where group coordination proceedings may be 
commenced.  The proposal suggests that is should be in the State “where the most crucial 
functions within the group are performed”.    But this may be no easy issue to resolve.  Secondly, 
the group coordination plan has to be approved by the court and individual IPs have the 
opportunity of commenting upon the plan before it is approved.  Thirdly, the group coordination 
plan is not binding on individual IPs though they have a duty to consider the recommendations in 
the plan and to explain deviations from the plan at creditors’ meetings. 
 
F. Applicable law - Missed opportunities 
Under the Regulation the law that applies to insolvency proceedings is, in general, the law of the 
State that opens the insolvency proceeding but Articles 5-15 contain several exceptions to this 
general principle.  By and large, Articles 5 -15 have not been tested to the same extent in case law 
as the COMI principle and the jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.  Nevertheless, the 
meaning of some of the Articles 5-15 provisions as well as the rules on “location” of assets in Art 
2(g) seem shrouded in uncertainty and to detract from the security of transactions which these 
provisions are supposed to guarantee.  Article 5, for example, states that the opening of 
insolvency proceedings shall not affect rights in rem of creditors over assets located in a State 
other than the State of the opening of proceedings.87 The general view reflected in the Virgos 
                                          
87 See generally on this P Smart, “Rights In Rem, Article 5 and the EC” (2006) 15 International 
Insolvency Review 18; M Balz, “The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings” 
(1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 485, 509-510. 
Schmit Report88 is that Article 5 embodies a ‘hard and fast’ rule89 that the holder of the right in 
rem can exercise its rights without any exception or limitation stemming from collateral carve-
outs for the benefit of unsecured creditors under the law of the COMI state.  This interpretation 
implies that Article 5 constitutes an exception to Article 4(2(i) which provides that the COMI 
State shall determine the rules “governing the distribution of proceeds from the realization of 
assets, the ranking of claims and the rights of creditors who have obtained partial satisfaction 
after the opening of insolvency proceedings by virtue of a right in rem or through a set-off”.90 
Arguably, Article 5 overprotects a secured creditor with foreign-located collateral because it 
gives a stronger level of protection against the debtor’s insolvency than that demanded by the 
national law of the situs.91  There is an EU bonus – a bonus for secured creditors in European 
cross-border insolvencies that is not available in domestic insolvencies.92 Unless secondary 
insolvency proceedings are opened in a particular State, a secured creditor is allowed to enforce 
against collateral in that State even though the country’s domestic law would not allow 
enforcement. 
                                          
88 See paras 97-104. 
89 For use of this expression see AJ Berends, “The EU Insolvency Regulation: Some Capita 
Selecta” [2010] Netherlands International Law Review 423, 429 and for discussion of rival 
approaches see 430-434. 
90 The Financial Markets Law Committee Issue paper no 30 (September 2012) European 
Insolvency Regulation, at p 11 suggests however that there is some uncertainty on the point.  See 
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91 See para 5.7 of the proposals prepared by Insol Europe, Revision of the European Insolvency 
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92 See M Virgos and F Garcimartin, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice (The 
Hague, Kluwer, 2004) 103-104: “Article 5 functions more as a rule of substantive law than as a 
simple conflict rule and when, compared with the national laws concerned, it may afford a 
stronger level of protection against the insolvency of the debtor than that which these national 
laws demand”. 
Article 5 however, does not define what is meant by a “right of rem”.  This is a source of some 
uncertainty but in general terms it covers security rights i.e. rights over property to ensure the 
payment of money or the performance of some other obligation. 
It is also not clear what is meant by “shall not affect” in Article 5 and whether in particular it 
prohibits temporary restrictions on the enforcement of security; the writing down of secured debt; 
and the realization of security by an IP against the wishes of a secured creditor. 
 
The Commission proposals leave Article 5 unchanged but make certain technical adjustments to 
the old Article 2(g) including new rules on the location of banks accounts.93 These changes 
introduce a welcome measure of clarification but certain difficulties remain; not least whether the 
location rules establish a hierarchy and how to treat tangible property that may be recorded in an 
ownership register.  The position of intellectual property rights is also unclear.94  
 
The Commission also proposes a new provision – article 6a on netting agreements stating that 
such agreements shall be governed solely by the law of the contract governing such agreements. 
This proposal may suggest that netting agreements are currently outside Article 6 of the 
Regulation which is worded so as to preserve certain set-off rights. Article 4(2)(d) states that the 
law of the insolvency forum shall govern the conditions under which set-offs may be invoked, 
but, under Art 6, set-off rights can still be claimed if they are permitted by the law applicable to 
the insolvent debtor’s claim. The BCCI95 litigation shows that set-off rights differ significantly 
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and in the case of cash held in accounts with a credit institution, the asset would be deemed to be 
located in the  State indicated in the 
account's IBAN. 
94 See Commission report -  COM(2012) 743 -  at p 12. 
95 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213. 
between States and the provision safeguards the position of creditors who have entered into 
certain transactions on the basis that set-off rights would be available.  On the other hand, the 
expression ‘set-off’ may be used in different States to refer to different legal processes.  It is not 
clear whether the expression should be given an autonomous interpretation for the purpose of the 
Regulation and whether this interpretation includes contractual netting.  In Eurofood96 the 
European court said that the COMI concept had to be given an autonomous interpretation but in 
the Bank Handlowy case97 they declined to give such an interpretation to the concept of closure 
of insolvency proceedings.  
 
The Commission also missed the opportunity of clearing up another ambiguity in the 
interpretation of Article 6 and, in fact, in the proposed new Article 6a compounds the area of 
ambiguity. Article 6, in allowing set-off rights that are permitted by the law applicable to the 
insolvent debtor’s claim does not say whether or not this has to be the law of an EU Member 
State.  One might argue that this limitation is implicit in the Regulation but one could contrast the 
wording of Article 6, and the proposed new Article 6a, with Article 13.  According to 
Article 4(2)(m), the law of the insolvency forum shall dictate the rules relating to the voidness, 
voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors.  Article 13 however, 
provides a defence where the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors 
provides proof that (i) the act is subject to the law of a different Member State and (ii) that law 
does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case. This veto is designed to 
uphold legitimate expectations based upon the circumstances that exist at the time of acting but 
the veto is specifically stated to apply only where the relevant law is the law of an EU Member 
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State. In comparing the language of Articles 6 and 13 one could apply the maxim expressio unius, 
exclusio alterius or alternatively dismiss the difference in wording as simply due to imprecision 
and inconsistency on the part of the drafter. 
 
Article 10a is another proposed new article from the Commission and it amends Articles 8 and 10 
of the Regulation. Article 8 provides that the effects of insolvency proceedings on contracts 
conferring the right to acquire or make use of immovable property are governed solely by the law 
of the Member State within whose territory the immovable property is situated. Article 10 states 
that the effect of insolvency on employment contracts and relations shall be governed by the law 
applicable to the contract of employment. The preamble to the Regulation states that the purpose 
of this provision is to protect both employees and jobs.98 The intention is that the law applicable 
to the employment contract would determine, for example, whether liquidation operates to 
terminate or to continue employment contracts. Other important employment law related matters 
are left to the law of the insolvency forum, including the preferential status of employee claims in 
liquidation. 
 
The intended new Article 10a states that where the law of a Member State “governing the effects 
of insolvency proceedings on the contracts referred to in Articles 8 and 10 provides that a 
contract can only be terminated or modified with the approval of the court opening insolvency 
proceedings but no insolvency proceedings have been opened in that Member State, the court 
which opened the insolvency proceedings shall have the competence to approve the termination 
or modification of these contracts.” It seems that behind the Commission proposal is the view 
that “different labour law standards may hinder an insolvency administrator to take the same 
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actions with regard to employees located in several Member States and that this situation may 
complicate the restructuring of a company.”99  On the other hand, the effect of the amendment 
would seem to deprive Article 10 of practically all force.  Article 10 has made a policy choice 
and the new Article 10a makes a different policy choice.  Certainly, the two do not sit neatly side 
by side.  Take for example, the situation where the law governing an employment contract 
provides that the contact may only be terminated where insolvency proceedings have been 
opened in the State where that law is the municipal law.  Article 10 would not allow the contract 
to be terminated if insolvency proceedings have proceedings in another State under a different 
law yet Article 10a would seem to permit this to be done.  Another example is where the law of 
the employment contract specifies various conditions that have to be satisfied before the court 
can authorise the termination of the employment contract. The proposed new Article 10a does not 
spell out whether the courts in the state that opens the insolvency proceedings have to abide by 
the same conditions.   
 
The clarification to Article 15 proposed by the Commission is more defensible and more readily 
comprehensible. Article 15 provides that the effects of insolvency proceedings on a lawsuit 
pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested shall be governed 
solely by the law of the Member State in which that lawsuit is pending. The Commission 
proposes to make it clear that reference to ‘lawsuits pending’ includes arbitration proceedings.100 
This clarification makes explicit what was held to be implicit in Article 15 by the English courts 
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situation is inherent in the policy choice underlying Article 10 which the evaluation study does 
not call into question. A harmonization of certain aspects of labour law could mitigate this 
problem but would be difficult to achieve since labour law is deeply rooted in national traditions 
and, at any rate, go beyond the scope of the revision of the Regulation.” 
100 See Commission report -  COM (2012)743 -  at p 13. 
in Syska v Vivendi Universal SA.101 The court suggested that it would border on the irrational to 
protect the legitimate expectations of those who had commenced an action against the insolvent 
but not those who had initiated a reference to arbitration. 
 
G. Publicity and improving the position of creditors 
The Insolvency Regulation contains some provisions for publicizing the existence of insolvency 
proceedings but these are essentially voluntary.  Article 21 states that a liquidator may request 
that notice of the opening of insolvency proceedings and the decision appointing him should be 
published in other Member States in accordance with the publication procedures in those States.  
Article 22 states that a liquidator may request that the opening of insolvency proceedings should 
be registered in the land registers, the trade register and any other public registers kept in other 
Member states.  The publication of the opening of the insolvency proceedings triggers a 
presumption that a person honouring an obligation for the benefit of a debtor is aware of the 
opening of insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor.102   
There may be a considerable time lag between the opening of insolvency proceedings and the 
proceedings being publicized in another State.  It is not therefore surprising that there have been a 
number of cases where main insolvency proceedings have been opened in an EU State even 
though main insolvency proceedings have already been opened in a different State. This was the 
case in Re Eurodis PLC103 where it was held that the courts of the State where the first 
proceedings had been opened were not entitled to disregard the second set of proceedings.  The 
                                          
101 [2008] EWHC 2155, [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 636. 
102 Article 24 provides a good discharge to a person honouring an obligation for the benefit of the 
debtor if that person is unaware that insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor have been 
opened in another Member State.   
 
103 [2011] EWHC 1025; [2012] BCC 57. 
court held that while a winding up order by a Belgian court probably ought not to have been 
made, since the main insolvency proceedings were in the UK, it had to stand as a valid order of 
the Belgian court unless set aside in Belgium. 
The Commission proposes an ambitious new regime to enhance the publicity of proceedings with 
Member States being required to publish relevant court decisions in  insolvency cases in  a ‘free’ 
and publicly  accessible  electronic  register  that  is  interconnected  with  the  registers  of other 
Member States.104 The information to be published includes information concerning the court 
opening the insolvency proceedings, the date of opening and of closing proceedings, the type of 
proceedings, the debtor, the liquidator appointed, the decision opening proceedings as well as the 
decision appointing the liquidator, if different, and the deadline for lodging claims. 
 
It is questionable whether the idea of a publicly accessible Community wide electronic register of 
insolvency proceedings is practically realisable. Moreover, given the considerable costs involved 
in the establishment and maintenance of such a system it is also questionable whether public 
funds should be committed to maintaining free access to the system. 
  
1. Improving the position of creditors   
One of the reasons why ‘local’ creditors may press for the opening of secondary proceedings is 
that the main proceedings are being transacted in a faraway country and in a language with which 
they may not be familiar. Foreign creditors may not be familiar with the procedures in the State 
where main proceedings have been opened including the proofs that have to be submitted and the 
time limits for lodging claims.  The creditor may be required to provide a translation of the claim 
into one of the official language of the State where the proceedings have been opened. 
                                          
104 New Articles 20a, 20b, 20c and 20d and revised Articles 21 and 22. 
Submitting a claim may require the services of a foreign lawyer or other professional.  All these 
transaction costs may make it uneconomical to submit a claim.  The European Commission has 
estimated that the average cost for a foreign creditor of lodging a claim is €2000 in a cross-border 
case. “Due to high costs, creditors may choose to forgo a debt, especially when it involves a 
small amount of money. This problem mainly affects small and medium-sized businesses as well 
as private individuals.” 105 
Articles 40–42 set out practical steps to try to alleviate the disadvantage that foreign-based 
creditors may suffer in practice. According to a French Commercial Court in R Jung GmbH v 
SIFA SA,106 under these provisions, creditors, whose head offices were in an EU State than the 
State where the proceedings had been opened, were entitled to receive a notice of information 
with the title ‘Invitation to lodge a claim. Time limits to be observed’. The court said that this 
title must appear on a form at the top, in all official languages of the EU institutions. If it did not 
do so, then the creditor was not subject to any time limits in respect of the bringing of a claim. 
The provisions in the Regulation however do not establish a comprehensive procedural 
framework.  They only set out minimum rules enabling foreign creditors to lodge their claims 
and, under Article 42(2), the foreign creditor may be required to provide a translation of the claim 
into the language of the State that opens the proceedings.  According to the Commission, “in 
some Member States requiring the translation has become the rule rather than the exception, 
thereby entailing additional costs and delays.”107 
                                          
105 See Commission report -  COM(2012)743 -  at pp 16-17.  
106 [2006] BCC 678. 
107 See Commission report -  COM(2012)743 -  at p 16. 
Recognising these issues, the Commission has fashioned a set of proposals that tries to facilitate 
the lodging of claims by foreign creditors.108 Firstly, it provides for the introduction of two 
standard forms.  One is for the notice to be sent to creditors and the other is for the lodging of 
claims. These standard forms will be made available in all EU official languages thereby 
reducing translation costs.  Secondly, each Member State is required to indicate at least one EU 
official language other than its own which it accepts for the purpose of the lodging of claims. 
Thirdly, foreign creditors are given at least 45 days following publication of the notice of opening 
of proceedings in the insolvency register to lodge their claims and this period applies regardless 
of any shorter periods under national law. Foreign creditors will also have to be informed if th ir 
claim is contested and afforded the opportunity of providing supplementary evidence to verify 
their claim. Finally, it is provided that representation by a lawyer or another legal professional 
shall not be mandatory for the lodging of claims.109 
Conclusion 
 
The general consensus reflected in the Commission proposals seems to be that the Regulation, on 
the whole, works well; that fundamental reform is not needed and could in fact be destabilising 
but that some reform would be beneficial to improve the practical operation of the Regulation.110  
Leading commentators, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, have described the proposals as a 
                                          
108 Revised Articles 39-41. 
109 Revised Article 39. 
110 It should be noted that the UK has “opted-in” to the proposal – see written ministerial 
statement of 15th April 2013 “Government consider that it is in the UK’s interest to opt in to the 
proposal because it will be of general benefit to creditors and businesses in the UK and EU.” The 
statement is available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130415/wmstext/130415m000
1.htm. 
“very decent”111 and as a “ modest attempt ….. to improve the status quo”. 112  The proposal will 
probably not do any harm except perhaps in relation to groups of companies where the revised 
Regulation opens up the possibility of multiple different plans for a group restructuring being put 
forward by IPs in different countries.  Given however, the time and expense in trying to 
formulate a restructuring plan this nightmarish vista is unlikely to be seen much in practice. 
In their proposals for a revised Regulation the Commission has stuck very much within the 
framework of the existing Regulation. The proposals do not set off on a new path or try to disturb 
the essential balance of interests at the heart of the political compromises that make up the 
Insolvency Regulation.113 Recital 11 of the preamble to Insolvency Regulation114 acknowledged 
that as a result of widely differing substantive laws it was not practical to introduce insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope throughout the entire EU and this calculus has not changed very 
fundamentally. Opinions still differ on the extent to which a company should be allowed to ignore 
or set aside existing contractual commitments during the insolvency process. The priority 
afforded secured credit115 and whether secured creditors are subject to a bankruptcy or 
                                          
111 See G Moss QC [2013] Insolvency Intelligence 55. 
112 See H Eidenmuller, fn 3, 150. 
113 See F Mucciarelli,”Not Just Efficiency: Insolvency Law in the EU and its Political 
Dimension” (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 175. 
114 Regulation 1346/2000. 
115 See JM Garrido, “No Two Snowflakes are the Same: The Distributional Question in 
International Bankruptcies” (2011) 46 Texas International Law Journal 459 at 460-461 that 
“there are no two priority systems that are identical, and that harmonization or unification of the 
law in this area is extremely unlikely to happen. In fact, priority systems are but the expression of 
the hierarchy of values that permeate a given legal system. This means that graduation of 
creditors is primarily political, and that the influence of powerful groups of creditors, the inertia 
of legal tradition, or the conscious and deliberate choice to promote certain values, are the factors 
that explain the fundamental differences encountered in various jurisdictions around the world.” 
restructuring moratorium and whether they can be subjected to a restructuring plan against their 
wishes are also areas where national differences remain pronounced.116 . 
There are also differences on the extent to which there should be an investigation of the reasons 
that caused the company’s financial difficulties and whether company management can he held 
personally responsible for these failings. There are different ideas about whether, and in what 
circumstances, pre-insolvency transactions may be set aside at the beckoning of an insolvency 
administrator and the importance ascribed to the security of transactions.117 Another important 
area of difference concerns the treatment of employees in insolvency, whether in the context of 
continuation of employment or pensions.118 National variation in the priority given to unpaid tax 
and environmental cleanup claims is also common. 
Some countries may place a strong emphasis on liquidation whereas others put a greater 
emphasis on business restructuring.  The last is however, is an area where the Commission have 
recognized, and tried to forge ahead with, a new consensus. In a Communication on a new 
European approach to business failure and insolvency they say: 
“As Europe is facing a severe economic and social crisis, the European Union is taking action to 
promote economic recovery, boost investment and safeguard employment. It is a high political 
priority to take measures to create sustainable growth and prosperity.”119 
                                          
116 See JL Westbrook, C Booth, C Paulus and H Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency 
Systems (Washington DC, The World Bank, 2010). 
117 See generally G McCormack,,”Conflicts, avoidance and international insolvency 20 years on 
– a triple cocktail” [2013] Journal of Business Law 141. 
118 See generally S Deakin and A Koukiadaki, “Capability theory, employee voice, and corporate 
restructuring: evidence from UK case studies" (2012) 33 Comparative Labor Law and Policy 
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119 Communication .  A new European approach to business failure and insolvency  COM (2012) 
742 at p 2 citing ‘President’ Barroso's letter to EP President in the framework of the State of 
Union address on 12 September 2012. 
The Commission  highlights the importance of insolvency rules in supporting economic activity 
and, as a first step towards achieving its ambitious goals, it puts forward “the modernisation of 
the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings”.120 The rhetoric seems overblown and far 
divorced from the quite modest changes proposed in the revised Insolvency Regulation.  While 
the modern tendency may be to hype everything and to herald eagerly rafts of new initiatives, this 
approach sows the seed of dillusionment and disappointed expectations.  More prosaically, the 
Commission missed out on the opportunity for desirable clarifications of the Regulation, for 
example, in the context of Article 5 and security rights over property. It suggests that the existing 
provisions “apply sufficiently smoothly within the EU and the respective fields of the lex fori and 
the lex situ strike the right balance.” 121 It is difficult to concur with this conclusion when the 
provisions are unclear. Moreover, the Commission does not propose amendments to the 
provisions of the Regulation concerning the recognition of, and coordination with, insolvency 
proceedings opened outside the EU. “[T]the main reason is that such provisions would be binding 
only in the territory of Member States and not in non-EU countries.”122 Nevertheless, in the 
context of set-off rights and netting agreements in Article 6, it would have been desirable to 
specify whether the Regulation applies if the relevant transaction is governed by a law of a non-
EU State. 
 
                                          
120 Communication, A new European approach to business failure and insolvency COM (2012) 
742 at p 8. In addition, the Commission suggested the adoption of a European Entrepreneurship 
Action Plan which would include action to promote efficient bankruptcy procedures and offering 
second chance. The plan “Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan: Reigniting the entrepreneurial 
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